Kentucky's biggest problem
The Wildcats crashed and burned spectacularly, laying bare their inability to close out games. It was an issue all year and needs to be addresed if Kentucky is to contend for titles.
First, a mea culpa. My last article was hilariously titled “Why UK fans shouldn’t worry too much”. I believed UK’s struggles over the last few weeks of the season were explainable and not systematic, and that UK would get back to a more impressive form when the stakes were highest. I was proven very wrong, and it’s clear I was overlooking some real issues this season.
Immediately after the loss to Saint Peter’s, I wanted to look through the data and see what I had missed. I honestly needed to take some time to figure out exactly what I wanted to write, and to find something meaningful to say. As I pored over the data, it became clear to me that Kentucky had major unaddressed issues around their approach to closing out games. An inability to correct these issues sabotaged a highly promising season, and will likely do so again unless addressed. In this edition of Hoops Insight, I explain why UK’s endgame approach was a disaster.
A pattern of late game collapse
Kentucky had 18 games this season where there was no garbage time (defined here). I’m using games with no garbage time so that the entire game was meaningful. In those 18 games, Kentucky was +93 in 1,127 possessions over the first 35 minutes. The Wildcats led 12 of the 18 games with 5 minutes remaining in regulation. Over the final 5 minutes + OT in these games Kentucky was -22 in 181 minutes. In only 2 of the 18 games did Kentucky outscore their opponents by more than 1 point over this final segment (Texas A&M, Mississippi State). In 10 of the 18 games Kentucky was outscored over this final segment. The only game where UK led with 5 minutes left and lost was against Saint Peter’s; the Wildcats had zero games where they trailed with 5 minutes left and won.
There were a couple of major problems that crept up late in games and were highly unusual. First, Kentucky committed turnovers at a very high rate late in games and didn’t force them. Second, Kentucky’s did a much worse job of rebounding opponent misses late in games. Both of these issues are directly traceable to UK’s key players in these areas.
In the first 35 minutes of these games, Sahvir Wheeler had a 2:1 assist to turnover ratio and turned the ball over on 6% of the possessions he played. But in the final 5 minutes, he turned the ball over on just under 10% of possessions he played and had 5 assists for every 6.5 turnovers. Given that he played about 80% of these crunch time minutes, that’s tremendously harmful.
Oscar Tshiebwe had an amazing year rebounding the ball, but late in games his defensive rebounding would drop off. He collected 33% of opponent misses in the first 35 minutes of these games, but just 24% in the final 5 minutes + OT.
These players were a big part of how UK built leads early in games, but in the clutch they just didn’t perform up to their usual standards. But they weren’t the only issue…
Misguided late-game strategy
Kentucky’s late game woes weren’t just due to players struggling in these situations. The coaching staff made decisions on how to approach late game situations on offense that directly hampered the team’s ability to win.
There was clearly a directive to the players to reduce or eliminate fast breaks late in the game. In the set of 18 games I’m analyzing, Kentucky took just 24 shots in transition during the final 5 minutes + OT compared to 35 for opponents. In the first 35 minutes, UK took more transition shots (247-204). One of the contributing factors is that UK got just 10 steals compared to 19 for opponents, but UK also eliminated the fast break after defensive rebounds. In the first 35 minutes of these games, UK took a transition shot about 1/3 of the time after rebounding an opponent miss. In the closing segments, UK did so just 4 times after 37 defensive rebounds.
Similarly, the coaching staff clearly directed the team to run the shot clock down more often during the final 5 minutes/OT. UK took 60 shots in the final 10 seconds of the clock compared to 36 for opponents; during the first 35 minutes, UK took about 10% fewer late clock shots than their opponents. This was a very poor choice, as UK posted a true shooting percentage of just 40% on these late clock shots during the final 5 minutes compared to 61% for opponents. UK chose to avoid transition opportunities in favor of running down the clock, which led to tough shots that UK missed. UK also was unable to defend for the length of the shot clock, giving up easy scores to opponents when they needed to bear down the most.
Kentucky clearly chose to prioritize different players and different types of shots to use these late-clock situations during the final 5 minutes, and these choices just make no sense to me at all. Let’s take a look at these…
A collapse of offensive structure
During the first 35 minutes, Kentucky had a number of offensive threats that they used in constructive ways during the final 10 seconds of the shot click. Oscar Tshiebwe posted a 67% TS% and took the most shots of any UK player in these spots. Kellan Grady had a 52% TS%, including 43% from three (although he went 2-12 from midrange late in the clock). Sahvir Wheeler was surprisingly very effective in late-clock situations, with a sparkling 70% TS%, including 5-6 from three and 4-7 at the rim; his only weak spot was 6-13 shooting from midrange in these spots.
Other players were excellent in some late-clock situations, but overall struggled a bit. Keion Brooks and Jacob Toppin combined to hit 11 of 14 shots at the rim late in the shot clock, but just 12 of 39 from midrange.
One player who generally struggled in late-clock situations was TyTy Washington. He In the first 35 minutes of games, he put up a 45% TS% in late-clock possessions. He hit just 6 of 18 from midrange and 2 of 8 from three, but did go 8 for 8 at the foul line to make some positive contributions.
During the final 5 minutes of these games, however, Kentucky lost all semblance of balance and structure in these late-clock situations. TyTy Washington took the most shots (14), but hit just 5 for a 36% TS%. Of these 14 shots, 12 were from midrange; unsurprisingly this dependence on midrange jumpers led to zero free throws for him. Sahvir Wheeler took the 2nd most shots (13) but hit just 4, for a 37% TS%, and he also took more shots from midrange than anywhere else.
Oscar Tshiebwe took just 8 shots, hitting 3 for a 38% TS%; he also went 2 for 7 from the free throw line on these possessions. Keion Brooks and Jacob Toppin combined for 10 late-clock shots in the last 5 minutes, but zero at the rim; they became ineffective jump shooters. Only Kellan Grady kept up his role and effectiveness, with a 50% TS% on 2 of 7 from three and 1 of 1 at the rim.
This is a complete failure of late-game strategy by the coaching staff in my opinion. There is no reason for UK to:
Make their offense more difficult by avoiding transition and waiting until late in the clock to take shots
Turn their late-clock offense into a series of midrange jumpers by guards who didn’t hit them at a high rate and didn’t draw free throws
Turn forwards who aren’t good jump shooters into strictly jump shooters instead of utilizing their finishing at the rim
Fail to get their All-American center shots
I can’t be sure, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the poor defense late in games was a result of the lack of cohesive offense. When the offense turns into 4 players watching a guard drain 25 seconds before dribbling into a 15 footer, it’s reasonable to think that the defensive focus would be lacking from these same players.
The bigger issue to me is that these late-game issues absolutely were not a problem for UK’s peers atop the SEC, and it kept the Cats from surpassing them.
Other SEC teams were very good late in games
As you can see, UK’s competition around the top of the SEC didn’t have the same structural issues late in games:
(all stats below for the last 5 minutes + any overtime, and exclude games with garbage time)
Alabama was +30 in 250 late game possessions, taking more transition shots than late-clock
Arkansas was +74 in 208 late game possessions, taking more transition shots than late-clock
Auburn was +39 in 183 late game possessions, taking more transition shots than late-clock
Tennessee was +26 in 184 late game possessions, taking more transition shots than late-clock
Kentucky was -22 in 181 late game possessions, taking fewer transition shots than late-clock
Kentucky’s inability to structure effective late-game offense put them behind their peers this season, and will continue to do so until they stop making things harder than they need to be and begin playing to their team’s strengths.